Many users assume a fresh VPN app download shields them from threats. The reality proves far more complicated. An audit of popular Windows clients reveals that more than half bundle OpenVPN versions over a year old. Some rely on code untouched for five years or longer. This gap leaves millions exposed even after they click update.
TechRadar examined 32 commercial VPN applications. The results startled security teams. Fifty-six percent ran OpenVPN releases more than 12 months behind current. Forty-one percent exceeded two years. Seven apps carried code from four years prior. Four still used builds dating back over five years. Providers such as Turbo VPN and VyprVPN operated on OpenVPN 2.4.7 from April 2019. TechRadar laid out the numbers in stark detail.
Contrast that with leaders. NordVPN, Windscribe and Proton VPN integrated versions as recent as April 2026. Their CTOs and engineers stressed the value of staying current. Yet the broader industry shows inertia. VPN firms ship slick interfaces and marketing features. The core tunneling engine often stays frozen.
OpenVPN itself records a steady stream of fixes. Six CVEs landed in 2025. Six more appeared in 2024. Each patch hardens the codebase against known attack paths. An attacker need not discover fresh flaws. They simply consult the changelog. Jason Xu, senior app developer at Windscribe, put it plainly. “An attacker doesn’t even need to find a new bug; they can just read the changelog.”
Microsoft researchers took a closer look in 2024. They uncovered four vulnerabilities that together enable remote code execution and local privilege escalation on Windows systems. The flaws sit inside openvpnserv.exe, the Windows TAP driver and the plugin system. CVE-2024-27459 triggers a stack overflow when the service reads a user-controlled byte count into a fixed stack buffer. CVE-2024-24974 grants unprivileged processes access to the named pipe \\openvpn\\service. From there adversaries can launch openvpn.exe with attacker-supplied configurations.
CVE-2024-27903 lets the plugin mechanism load libraries from arbitrary paths. Combine that with a malicious plugin and the door swings open. A fourth issue, CVE-2024-1305, creates an integer overflow in the TAP driver. All four affected releases before OpenVPN 2.6.10 and 2.5.10. Microsoft reported them through coordinated disclosure in March 2024. The fixes arrived later that summer. Microsoft urged immediate upgrades and published detection queries for Defender XDR.
But many VPN vendors lag. They cite compatibility testing, custom modifications and internal backports. Marijus Briedis, CTO at NordVPN, explained the tension. “Because OpenVPN — like any project — regularly patches vulnerabilities, hardens its codebase, and improves performance, running a version that’s years behind might miss security components that current up-to-date versions offer.”
Dr. Peter Membrey, chief research officer at ExpressVPN, warned of mounting debt. “Being several years behind can indicate a growing body of security, compatibility, and operational debt. The further behind you fall, the harder each upgrade gets.” Some providers apply selective patches without bumping the full version string. Others remove deprecated drivers or swap in their own transport layers. The result? Users see a current app version yet inherit yesterday’s risks.
Recent months added fresh warnings. In May 2026 Cisco Talos disclosed TALOS-2026-2381, tracked as CVE-2026-35058. The reachable assertion sits inside TLS Crypt v2 client key extraction. A sequence of crafted network packets crashes the process. OpenVPN 2.6.x and early 2.8_git builds fall victim. Emma Reuter of Cisco ASIG found the bug. The Talos team noted that an attacker on the network path could trigger denial of service with minimal effort. Cisco Talos included the finding in a larger vulnerability roundup that also touched Norton VPN and other tools.
OpenVPN’s own security page lists additional advisories. CVE-2025-13086 affects Access Server copies of the 2.6 branch and enables remote denial of service. Updates to 3.0.2 close the hole. Other 2025 and 2026 CVEs target buffer issues, authentication bypasses and privilege escalation on macOS via background services. The pattern holds. New flaws surface. Patches follow. Yet adoption inside commercial clients remains uneven.
Why does this persist? Open source code grants freedom. It also creates fragmentation. VPN companies fork the project, strip features or layer proprietary obfuscation. Each change demands regression testing across Windows, macOS, Android and iOS. Enterprise customers demand stability. A single crash during a critical remote session can cost contracts. So teams accept six-to-eighteen month delays if they believe critical patches receive backports.
Karolis Kaciulis, lead systems engineer at Surfshark, called that window reasonable when urgent fixes ship quickly. Proton VPN takes a different stance. Spokespeople describe OpenVPN as “slow and bloated” compared with WireGuard. The company now steers users toward its Stealth protocol and plans to phase out OpenVPN inside client apps altogether.
Enterprises face steeper consequences. A compromised VPN client can serve as initial access for ransomware crews or espionage operations. Microsoft’s chained attack requires valid credentials first. That hurdle drops when phishing or endpoint malware steals them. Once inside the named pipe, the rest unfolds with modest Windows knowledge. Detection relies on watching for suspicious pipe events or unexpected plugin loads. Few organizations monitor at that granularity.
Smaller providers sometimes lack resources to track upstream changes. Larger ones weigh user experience against theoretical risk. Norton, for instance, told TechRadar it evaluates each OpenVPN update for stability and performance impact before rolling forward. The calculus favors caution. But caution carries its own cost when known vulnerabilities sit unpatched for years.
Users hold limited visibility. Release notes rarely list the exact OpenVPN build. Logs sometimes expose the version string. Savvy administrators can query client settings or run packet captures to infer the protocol details. Most consumers never look. They trust the green lock icon and the brand name.
And the threat environment keeps shifting. State actors and criminal groups scan for VPN endpoints with known weaknesses. Supply-chain attacks on open source components grow more sophisticated. A single outdated library linked deep inside the VPN binary can undermine the entire encryption promise. OpenSSL versions bundled in older OpenVPN releases carry their own history of high-severity bugs.
So what should security teams do? First, audit every VPN client in the fleet. Check the embedded OpenVPN version against the latest community release. Ask vendors for transparency on patch timelines and backport policies. Consider migrating high-risk users to WireGuard where supported. The protocol ships with a smaller attack surface and faster updates in many commercial offerings.
Where OpenVPN remains mandatory, enforce strict access controls. Rotate credentials frequently. Segment client traffic. Monitor for anomalous connection attempts or crashes that could signal exploitation. Tools from Microsoft Defender can flag named-pipe abuse. Open-source scanners can fingerprint client binaries for outdated libraries.
Vendors must do better. Treating the OpenVPN component as a black box invites trouble. Regular upstream merges, automated testing pipelines and clear version reporting would close the transparency gap. A few already follow that path. More should follow.
The lesson cuts across the industry. An app update alone no longer suffices. Security hinges on every layer, including the quiet protocol engine running beneath the surface. Ignore it and the protection you advertise becomes little more than theater. Users and enterprises alike deserve more.
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